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A month after the terrorist attacks in Brussels in March 2016, a debate on existing tools and possible future measures to combat terrorism took place in the European Parliament featuring interventions by Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and the Dutch Minister of Defence Jeanine Hennis-Plaesschaert representing the Council Presidency. That intervention went hand-in-hand with practical measures. Shortly before the events in Brussels, Europol, the European Union (EU)’s law enforcement agency, had launched the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC). A year later, meanwhile,  Directive (EU) 2017/541 on combating terrorism was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council (2017). Focused on foreign terrorist fighters and terrorist financing it had the purpose of establishing ‘minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area of terrorist offences […] as well as measures of protection of, and support and assistance to, victims of terrorism.’ Significant terrorist attacks in Europe tend now to lead to questions about the relevance of the EU and calls to strengthen counter-terrorist cooperation among the Member States. This suggests that, while some remain sceptical about the effectiveness of its policies (Bures 2011), the EU has acquired an increasingly significant role in this policy domain.
Such was not always the case. For years, several European countries, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom and (West) Germany included, tackled terrorism largely on their own. The general perception was that each state faced a distinct threat, for instance ETA (‘Basque Fatherland and Liberty’) in Spain, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Irish Republican Army in the UK, or the Red Army Faction in Germany (Chalk 1996). Cooperation amongst European states remained extremely limited. Some European governments even accused others of actually enabling the growth of terrorism. As noted by Heiberg (2007: 42), after 1982,
 
to the intense irritation of the Spanish socialists, the French government insisted on continuing its policy of offering ETA a safe haven in southern France, viewing the militants as freedom fighters and political refugees. This safe haven offered ETA the opportunity to train its recruits, plan its operations, headquarter its leadership, and maintain its weapon supplies. After operations in Spain ETA militants would withdraw to the impunity of France.

This lack of a shared perception of the terrorist threat and the virtual absence of counter-terrorism cooperation amongst European states in the 1970s and 1980s, means the present existence of EU-wide debates, legislative instruments and practical cooperation is particularly remarkable. This article considers how this change came about by drawing upon ‘collective securitization’, the concept at the heart of this collection of articles. 

The collective securitization of terrorism in the EU
This section applies the six-stage model of collective securitization developed by **** (this issue) to the case of terrorism in the EU. Stage three (the securitizing move) and stage four (the audience response) are combined into one single section given their co-dependence. As *** themselves note, while it is  analytically possible to distinguish the securitizing move from the audience response, these two stages ‘are co-dependent through the process of recursive interaction.’ This blurring of the boundaries between actor and audience is particularly pronounced in the case of the EU because it combines both supranational and inter-governmental features. In the case of EU counter-terrorism, one other aspect of the collective securitisation framework bears repeating. In contrast to some of the literature on securitization, the framework guiding this Special Issue considers that securitizing policies need not have emergency characteristics: the politics of exceptionalism and routine, may well co-exist. What matters for securitization is that a given policy development (one which may be an adaptation of pre-existing initiatives) is justified by the existence of the threat that has been highlighted in the securitizing move (see also Floyd 2016: 679).

(1) Status quo security discourse and policies
Although one may consider that there have been various terrorist events affecting European countries in recent history, it is generally agreed that modern terrorism in Europe can be traced back to the 1970s (Bossong 2013: 25). Then, several European states experienced attacks committed by various ethno-nationalist and separatist groups, including ETA in Spain and the IRA in the United Kingdom. Others were hit by left-wing terrorist groups, such as the Red Brigades in Italy and the Red Army Faction in West Germany. In addition, groups originating in the Middle East, including Black September, committed terrorist attacks in an attempt to influence European foreign policies (Bossong 2013: 25). The 1970s, in fact, witnessed a huge increase in the number of terrorist incidents across western Europe with 1979 (in the period 1970 – 2015) being the peak year for the number of incidents recorded (Merelli 2015; Alcantara 2017).  While no single event in the 1970s through to the 1990s matched the number of injured and killed in 9/11 (or, for that matter, the 2004 Madrid train bombings) this period was not without mass killings (as the downing of Pan Am flight 103 by Libyan agents over Lockerbie attests). Yet the rising incidents of attacks prior to 2001 did not lead to a collective securitization of terrorism either by the EU or its predecessor the European Economic Community (EEC).
European states when confronted with a terrorist threat tended to consider it a domestic issue that had to be dealt with ‘at home.’ This lack of a shared perception of threat meant counter-terrorism cooperation was severely limited (Chalk 1996). Some European states (France, (West) Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) were hit by terrorist attacks with unfortunate regularity, others (Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, the Netherlands) less so and some (Denmark, Sweden) on only isolated occasions. Relatedly, significant differences existed between the various terrorist threats affecting European states. Both Spain and the UK faced separatist violence – but the IRA and ETA were in no sense part of a shared endeavour which might have encouraged collaboration to counter it. Terrorist groups inspired by violent left-wing ideology were similarly disparate in character, sharing a certain revolutionary leftism but not a common cause; and neither was part of a Europe-wide network of violent activism. A third factor inhibiting counter-terrorist cooperation was the persistence of concerns over national sovereignty, something that went hand in hand with the existence of different historical, political and legal traditions amongst various European states. The French authorities, for example, were willing to openly negotiate with terrorists and accommodate their demands (dramatically evident in the events surrounding the 1974 attack on the French embassy in the Hague by the communist Japanese Red Army). This stood in marked contrast to the approach favoured by some other governments, notably the British, whose response to violent Irish republicanism was enhanced policing, internment and military presence. Negotiations with the IRA when they did occur in the 1970s and early 1980s were secret and sporadic (Watt 2008). 
None of this is to say that cooperation was absent.  The 1972 Munich massacre during the summer Olympics, did give rise to some limited initiatives. Counter-terrorism officers began to develop bilateral contacts (Chalk 1996: 121-122) and some initial multilateral counter-terrorism efforts also took place, albeit outside the EEC through Interpol and the Council of Europe. The latter was the home of the 1978 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism.  That instrument aimed to facilitate the arrest of suspected terrorists by limiting the use of the 'political offence' exception, which up to that point had been a major obstacle to extradition. However, it was not ratified for a considerable number of years by several of its early signatories, including Belgium, France, Greece, and Italy (Bossong 2013: 26). Counter-terrorism cooperation at the practical level also developed amongst European states within the TREVI group. (Argomaniz 2009: 152-153). Here, two operational working groups dealing with information exchange on terrorist cases and specialist training were established and while their achievements were modest, TREVI did help develop trust amongst individual police and intelligence officers across the EEC. A similar influence was also wielded by the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGOT), a semi-permanent working group independent of TREVI, that promoted working relationships amongst European police officers (in contrast with TREVI, which was a ministry-level initiative). Finally, counter-terrorism was also part of nascent cooperation amongst the signatories of the 1985 Schengen Treaty (Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany). Terrorism was identified as one of the illicit activities that might benefit from the lifting of internal border controls and so required that that the problem be addressed by cross-border law enforcement and police cooperation (Chalk 1996: 127). 
Such measures, while of interest, do not detract from the fact that European counter-terrorism cooperation prior to 9./11 was characterised by limitations. The intergovernmental nature of attempts at  counter-terrorism cooperation, differing perceptions of the terrorist threat,  a  concomitant lack of a shared definition of terrorism, as well as the wide range of institutional venues, both inside and outside the EEC/EC, in which West European States had begun to cooperate all pointed to a haphazard and disjointed European approach. (Den Boer 2000).

(2) Precipitating event
According to *** (this issue), the second stage of collective securitization involves ‘a single precipitating event or a set of cascading events of gravity sufficient to disrupt [the] status quo and prompt a perception by the securitizing actor (and its audience) that the qualitative character of the internal or external security environment has worsened.’ In the case of the collective securitization of terrorism in the EU, one can identify such a precipitating event in the shape of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (or ‘9/11’). On that day four airplanes were hijacked by 19 terrorists associated with al Qaeda. Two aircraft were flown into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre in New York City, whilst the third hit the Pentagon and the fourth crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. These attacks were a watershed. They were large in scale (almost 3,000 people lost their lives), and spectacle (the destruction of the Twin Towers inspired a sense of dread in the US because it was visually memorable as well as tragic).  The broadcast of the plane slamming into the second of the Twin Towers and the subsequent collapse of the iconic buildings in New York  were watched by millions of people around the world (Gonçalves 2016: 1). By this act, al Qaeda also disrupted the status quo in the field of counter-terrorism by confirming that the character of the terrorist threat was changing. Walter Laqueur (1999) had argued shortly prior to the attacks that terrorism was moving away from the calculated use of violence for political gain towards fanaticism and the pursuit of catastrophic destruction. Other experts had warned  of ‘super-terrorism’, ‘mega-terrorism’ or ‘hyper-terrorism’ to suggest that the world was facing a new type of threat, one that was more lethal, more dangerous and less predictable than it had ever been before (Neumann 2009: 3). The jihadist message of al Qaeda, meanwhile, reinforced a growing perception that a new threat, namely that of Islamist terrorism, had arisen, one far more worrying than that posed by left-wing or ethno-nationalist terrorist groups in certain European countries. 
In this sense, 9/11 was a single precipitating event for the collective securitization of terrorism in the EU. The terrorist attacks on that occasion were uniquely grave in character and while they occurred far from Europe, they were seen to portend something threatening to liberal and open societies writ large, those in Europe included. This is not to say that the numerous Islamist terrorist attacks that happened later in Europe, including in Madrid, London, Paris, Brussels and Nice, did not have any impact on the EU counter-terrorism policy, for they certainly did. However, from an analytical viewpoint, these can be seen as belonging to the final stage of the collective securitization framework, which concerns routinization and the emergence of a new status quo, rather than playing a role in the initial collective securitization process itself.  

(3) Securitizing moves and audience response
President George W. Bush in a public briefing with his National Security team declared the attacks of 9./11 to be unprecedented. ‘The deliberate and deadly attacks’, he suggested, ‘were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war.’ [...] ‘This enemy attacked not just our people but all freedom-loving people everywhere in the world.’ [...] ‘We will rally the world.’ [...] ‘This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil, but good will prevail’ (cited in BBC News 2001a).  These statements framed the response – if terrorism was an act of war then a ‘war on terror’ against terrorists with a global reach was entirely appropriate (Bush 2001).  And this securitizing move was exceptional in character– the language of war helped justify a military (not simply a civilian) response, the roll-out of rendition and enhanced interrogation, an elevated sense of patriotism and a demonization of al Qaeda and its presumed accomplices (the Afghan Taliban and subsequently the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq) (Freedman 2008: 386-387). 
	But how did this dynamic relate to Europe? Here, one should note the enormous pressure for other countries to adopt the norm of response articulated in Washington. Bush defined appropriate action by distinguishing between ‘good and evil.’ Since nobody would want to be associated with the former, it was imperative to join with the US and so to count as a ‘force of good.’ Bush (BBC News 2001a) reinforced this position by stating that ‘you are either for us or against us.’ In this presentation, there was no grey area. The countries supporting terrorism would later be called part of an ‘axis of evil.’ It was therefore appropriate and even imperative to support the US, in whichever way needed. In this spirit, NATO invoked the mutual defence clause of the organisation's founding treaty for the first time ever in its history (NATO 2001). The wider international community also rallied. The United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, declaimed that the UN’s host city had just been subjected to a terrorist attack of a kind one hardly dared imagine ‘even in our worst nightmares.’ It did not pass unnoticed, Annan pointed out, that the UN General Assembly ‘had condemned terrorism on numerous occasions and had called on all States to adopt measures to prevent terrorism and strengthen international cooperation against it.’ Echoing, President Bush, he suggested that ‘[a]ll nations of the world must be united in their solidarity with the victims of terrorism, and in their determination to take action -– both against the terrorists themselves and against all those who give them any kind of shelter, assistance or encouragement’ (cited in United Nations 2001).
Several European political leaders also lined up behind Bush and his Administration often echoing his bellicose language. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder described the attacks as ‘a declaration of war against the entire civilized world’, whilst EU External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten called 9/11 ‘an act of war by madmen’ (cited in Bossong 2013: 39). Schröder also called on European nations to band together within the framework of the EU to combat global terrorism. ‘Only if we put in place common policing and judicial resources’, he suggested, can we ensure that there will be no hideouts for terrorists and other criminals in the European Union’ [...] ‘We are ready to make Europe into an international player with global influence’ (BBC News 2001b). 
What is particularly noticeable here is that the referent object in this discourse was not the EU or even Europe. Al Qaeda was posited as threatening to something far broader - ‘the civilized world’, of which the US and European states are part. This was notably evidenced by Jacques Chirac’s statement in New York on 19 September 2001 – in the context of a meeting with President Bush. Chirac avoided describing the response to 9/11 as a new war but was clear nonetheless that the civilised world was now ‘faced with a conflict of a completely new nature’ and so France would, side-by-side with the US, ‘discuss all means to fight and eradicate this evil’ (CNN 2001). While the American proclivity for military action was a source of European concern, this did not prevent an EU commitment to ‘complete solidarity and full cooperation [with the US] to ensure that justice is done.’ The 9/11 attacks were, the European Council declared, ‘an assault on our open, democratic, tolerant and multicultural societies’ (Conclusions of the Extraordinary European Council, 21 September 2001 cited in Den Boer and Monar, 2002: 12). Summarising the EU position shortly after 9/11, Richard Jackson (2007: 236) has noted that it shared with the Bush administration a discourse in which terrorism as perpetrated by al Qaeda posed ‘a clear, unprecedented and existential threat to modern societies’ involving ‘unimaginable mass destruction’ and a challenge to ‘democracy […] civilisation and the international system itself.’ 

(4) Policy outputs
The EU moved rapidly from statements of sympathy and solidarity with the US to a discussion of its own counter-terrorism policy. As early as 12 September 2001, the Council requested the Presidency, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Commission to submit, as soon as possible, a ‘report on concrete measures’ that may be recommended to ‘[increase] the capacity of the European Union to effectively fight, together with the United States and other partners, international terrorism’ (Council of the European Union 2001: 4; italics added). On 14 September, in a Joint Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government of the European Union, the Presidents of the European Parliament and the European Commission, and the High Representative, the EU emphasised two specific policy objectives namely ‘[strengthening the] intelligence efforts against terrorism’ and ‘[accelerating] the implementation of a genuine European judicial area, which will entail, among other things, the creation of a European warrant for arrest and extradition, in accordance with the Tampere Conclusions, and the mutual recognition of legal decisions and verdicts’ (European Union 2001: 2).
The Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council met on 20 September 2001, and agreed on a package of measures endorsed by an extraordinary European Council meeting the following day. At that meeting, the European Council launched an ambitious ‘Action Plan to Combat Terrorism’ involving ‘close cooperation between all the Member States of the EU’ and the adoption of a ‘coordinated and interdisciplinary approach embracing all the Union’s policies’ (European Council: 2001). This made the European collective response as comprehensive as possible and essentially multidimensional. The EU avoided phrasing these measures as a ‘war on terror’, however, it was clear that a qualitatively new set of challenges was being faced – ‘a global threat’ according EU discourse - that required creative responses (English 2007: 237) In speaking to the European Parliament, the Commissioner responsible for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) (formerly Justice and Home Affairs), Antonio Vitorino, declared: ‘[t]errorist acts are committed by international groups with bases in several countries, exploiting loopholes in the law created by the geographical limits on investigators and often enjoying substantial financial and logistical resources. Terrorists take advantage of differences in legal treatment between states, in particular where the offence is not treated as such by national law, and that is where we have to begin’ (cited in Financial Times 2001). By these words, Vitorino highlighted the crucial need for legal harmonisation in tackling terrorism. 
In the shape of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), the Commission followed up with a timely proposal (Kaunert 2007, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). The EAW had been in preparation for about two years before it was launched. Vitorino initially intended to launch it under the Spanish Presidency in the first half of 2002 as a response to Spain’s own problems with ETA. Yet, with the emerging counter-terrorism norm, it became apparent that swift action was required. Ministers in AFSJ would be under intense pressure to behave appropriately and settle their differences. Vitorino remarked: ‘[i]f we do not get agreement, and it should be a substantial agreement to cope with the global threat, it will be difficult to explain to the public why we failed’ (cited in Financial Times 2001). The European Commission’s strategy was thus for the EAW to be presented as a counter-terrorism measure and to be amalgamated with other such measures, such as the Framework Decision on the Definition on Terrorism (Kaunert 2007, 2010c).
The EAW is an exemplar of integration in EU counter-terrorism after 9/11. Involving the introduction of the principle of mutual recognition, the EAW John Vogel (2001: 937) has argued was a ‘revolution in extradition law.’ Prior to its adoption, extradition between EU Member States was based on several different intergovernmental measures. The EAW does not create new international law, but rather transnational or ‘European’ law (Wagner 2003b). It replaced all previous international legal instruments amongst the different Member States with an EU legal instrument subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (Peers 2001) and applicable to 32 different categories of crime. 
A further key development was the adoption of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism agreed by the Council in December 2001. This amounted to the first time that a common definition of terrorism had been agreed at the supranational level, particularly remarkable given that a number of Member States lacked even a national legal definition of the phenomenon (Douglas-Scott 2004). The Framework Decision defines a terrorist act in three parts: (1) the context of an action; (2) the aim of the action; and (3) the specific acts being committed. Terrorist acts ‘must be intentional […] which given their nature or context, may serve to damage a country or an international organisation. These acts must be committed with the aim of either seriously intimidating a population or unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to act or fail to act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional economic or social structures of a country or international organisation’ (cited in Bures 2006: 68). Eight specific acts are then listed. The definition also covers behaviours which may contribute to terrorist acts in third countries. The Framework Decision thus ensures that terrorist offences are punished by heavier sentences than common criminal offences. Furthermore, Member States are legally responsible to act in cases of terrorist incidents that take place on their own territory or are committed against their own people. The Framework Decision was also favourable to EU-US cooperation insofar as terrorism as a category of crime obtained specific recognition on both sides of the Atlantic.
Thus, the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 became a normative defining point – for European integration. It also marked a significant moment for the Commission, which managed to construct an important role for as ‘strategic first mover’ in shaping debate and action on counter-terrorism. The Commission allied with the US to put pressure on reluctant Member States to act. Recognising the significance of European action, former US Homeland Security Secretary, Thomas Ridge, stated that his greatest regret was not having worked more closely with the EU from the start (Lebl 2006: 125). The European Commission thus managed to rhetorically and practically securitize terrorism. 
However, it is important to underline that these important EU policy developments were not immediately followed by changes at the domestic level. As argued by Argomaniz (2009: 157), ‘[the] reality […] is that the implementation record during this period [was] poor.’ This became particularly evident in the wake of the terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004. On that occasion, the European Council (2004: 3) adopted a Declaration on Combating Terrorism, which emphasised that the ‘combating of terrorism requires that measures adopted by the Council be effectively and comprehensively implemented by Member States.’ The Declaration listed six key legislative measures that had to be adopted by all Member States by June 2004. Even then, as argued by Monar (2005: 142), ‘nine Member States had, by [December 2004], still not fully implemented the framework decision on combating terrorism. In addition, nine (partly different) EU countries had not implemented the legislation on joint investigation teams and one Member State (Italy) had still parliamentary ratification problems with the European arrest warrant.’ 
But the pace of EU action continued. The Commission helped forge the EU-US Container Security Initiative (CSI) in 2004, aimed at ensuring greater protection for containers being transported from Europe (and a number of other important ports around the world) to the US (MacKenzie 2012). The first EU-US Passenger Name Recognition  agreement was also negotiated in 2003-2004 (albeit struck down by the ECJ).   

(5) The routinization of EU counter-terrorism cooperation and the emergence of a new status quo
After an intense phase of securitization of the terrorist threat in the EU between 2001 and 2004 a period of relative inertia followed. This is a pattern that has repeated itself over the years (Argomaniz 2009, 2011). Terrorist attacks tend to lead to a spike in the number of EU counter-terrorism policy initiatives, to be followed by a period of deceleration until a new terrorist attack pushes terrorism to the top of the policy agenda once more. In so doing, the new terrorist attack sheds light on the remaining challenges and possible problems of implementation, which may then be addressed by new initiatives. Thus, the implementation of EU measures at the domestic level often lags one terrorist attack behind. Nevertheless, despite what some may perceive as the slow development of EU counter-terrorism policy (Argomaniz 2011, Bures 2011), policy developments clearly point towards the gradual strengthening of the EU’s role in counter-terrorism governance in Europe. Institutional innovations have reinforced this trend. 
A greater role for the European Commission did not really emerge until 2009, when the Treaty of Lisbon came into force (Kaunert 2010c). Through this treaty, the Commission gained further powers to negotiate agreements with third states and from then on was able to negotiate agreements in the former third pillar, starting with the re-negotiation of the SWIFT agreement between February and July 2010 after its earlier rejection by the European Parliament (Servent and MacKenzie 2012). Further agreements negotiated by the European Commission have included the EU’s PNR agreements with the US (2012), Australia (2012), and Canada (2014). What we have, therefore, seen is a gradual expansion of the Commission’s powers over the past decade. 
	The Commission’s role has been paralleled by that of a largely under-estimated body – the office of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC). In 2004, following the Madrid bombings, the EU decided to appoint its first CTC, Gijs de Vries. This position lacked the institutional heft of the Commission and its weakness appeared to be confirmed when de Vries resigned in March 2007 with the post then being left vacant for six months amid  rumours that it might be abolished  (Bossong 2013). However, Gilles de Kerchove – an EU insider – then took up the position in September 2007 and as of April 2018 remained the incumbent. There is no specific EU legislation setting out the Coordinator’s powers. Formally, the post was established by the European Council in its 2004 Declaration on Combating Terrorism (Council of the European Union 2004). While quickly nicknamed the EU’s ‘Mr. Terrorism’ or the ‘European terrorism czar’ by the media, the actual formal mandate of the EU CTC was general and imprecise. 
In practice, however, during his lengthy period of service, de Kerchove has made significant efforts to improve counter-terrorism cooperation within Europe and with key partners around the world. The EU CTC has audited the progress of the 200 plus measures that sit within the ambit of the Action Plan on Combat Terrorism. To that end, the CTC, publishes an implementation report every six months, as well as more specialised reports on various aspects of EU counter-terrorism policy. Although these are sometimes rather critical both of the deficiencies of the EU Member States and EU agencies, at least in the latter case, the content of the report is always an outcome of prior consultations. The Coordinator is also tasked with coordinating  a plethora of institutions and committees that have a role in different aspects of EU counter-terrorism policy, as well as  encouraging greater cooperation between the Commission (which drafts legislation) and the Council (where national Interior and Foreign Affairs ministers meet to decide EU policies). That said, the Coordinator lacks both powers and resources to coordinate the work of the Commission and the Council itself.   
Europol has also become an important player in EU counter-terrorism. As already noted, its role was reinforced in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and it has steadily increased since then. Europol’s counter-terrorist efforts have been mainly directed towards tackling Islamist inspired terrorism. Its activities have entailed: (a) analysing gathered information from strategic, tactical and operational perspectives; (b) undertaking threat and risk assessments, and, based on their results, crafting and implementing awareness activities; (c) on request, supporting operational investigations in the Member States; (d) monitoring, tracking and preventing all forms of illicit trafficking of nuclear material, strong radiological sources, arms, ammunition, explosives as well as WMD; (e) and maintaining regular contact with terrorist and counter-proliferation experts. 
In order to strengthen Europol’s counter-terrorist efforts, the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) was created within Europol in January 2016. The official website of Europol and serving officers present the ECTC as an operations centre and hub of expertise that reflects the growing need for the EU to strengthen its response to terrorism. The ECTC focuses on: (a) tackling foreign fighters; (b) sharing intelligence and expertise on terrorism financing amongst Member States (through the Terrorist Finance Tracking Programme and the Financial Intelligence Unit); (c) monitoring and suggesting preventive measures against online terrorist propaganda and extremism (through the EU Internet Referral Unit); (d) countering illegal arms trafficking; and (e) international cooperation among counter-terrorism authorities. In short, in the years since 2001, counter-terrorism cooperation has become increasingly institutionalised in the EU, as epitomised by the creation of the post of CTC and of the ECTC within Europol. This institutionalisation has contributed greatly to the routinization of EU counter-terrorism practices.

Conclusion
This article set out to explore the significant growth in EU cooperation on counter-terrorism, which includes various important legislative instruments that have had a significant impact on the EU Member States. It did so by drawing upon the concept of ‘collective securitization’. The analysis highlighted how 9/11 was a single precipitating event, which led some EU leaders to call for the governments of the EU Member States to agree on developing an EU counter-terrorism policy and step up counter-terrorism cooperation with the US. Various counter-terrorism legislative instruments have been adopted, such as that defining terrorist acts, some of which have had a significant impact on national counter-terrorism policies. 9/11 was therefore used by some actors to convince the EU Member States that, although some of them may continue to face threats from ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups, they now all faced one major, collective terrorist threat, embodied at the time by al Qaeda, rather than each of them facing a distinctive threat as had been hitherto a common view across Europe. This was a crucial development as it paved the way for the development of EU counter-terrorism cooperation for the first time, cooperation which subsequently became institutionalised and routinized in EU formats. 
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